Английский язык. Практический курс для решения бизнес-задач Пусенкова Нина

From JIT to Lean Manufacturing

The History of Just in Time

Around 1980 we were all just getting used to the concepts of Material Requirements Planning (MRP) and Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRPII) with their dependence on complex computer packages when we began to hear of manufacturers in Japan carrying no stock and giving 100% customer service without any of this MRP sophistication.

Japanese car manufacturers ensured that every steering column was assembled and fed onto a production line just as the car into which it was to be fitted rolled up at that particular stage. This was all managed by something called a kanban which meant «tag» and was the mechanism by which the assembly line told the feeder areas that they wanted another component. The first visitors to Japan came back to tell us that the kanban replaced MRP and was the key to Japanese success.

In time, we learned that the kanban was the last improvement step of many, not the first. The conceptual goals of minimised lead times and inventories rated above all else. The Japanese aim was having everything only when required and only in the quantity required – in other words, just-in-time (JIT).

We then learned that Toyota led the way in the development of the Japanese approach. We heard of something called the Toyota Production System which was the model for all that had happened in Japanese manufacturing. We heard of Taiichi Ohno, the production engineer responsible for this breakthrough.

The list below highlights what our Japanese counterparts had done.

1. Batch Quantities

Making something in large batches has several negative effects. The first thing which Westerners recognised was that stock levels are partly a function of order sizes. We had a formula for economic batch sizing in which the cost of set-up was offset against the cost of holding the stock. Our theoretical average stock level was half the order quantity + whatever element of safety stock we had built into our plans so reducing the order size would reduce our average stock.

There were, however, other considerations. A piece of plant cannot be immediately responsive to all demands upon it if it makes parts in greater quantities than are required at the time. Responsiveness, and hence service to our customers (whether they be external or the subsequent operations within our own plant) requires that we manufacture components in small batches.

We knew that smooth workloads make management of the manufacturing process far easier and had established smooth finished product plans with the adoption of Master Production Scheduling. However, no matter how smooth our final assembly plans, we still had lumpiness elsewhere.

The major contributor to parts being made in large batches is, of course, set-up times. Shigeo Shingo, a quality consultant hired by Toyota, had set about effectively eliminating set-ups. The accounting conventions that led Western businesses to make significant quantities of parts that may not be used were also shown to be ludicrous.

2. Safety Stocks / Quality

A major element of Western manufacturing’s inventory was that which we held in case of problems. We held safety stocks to allow us to continue manufacturing should some of the components or raw materials in our stores be found to be defective.

Ohno and his colleagues, ironically, had listened to the American quality gurus, W. Edwards Deming and Joseph Juran, who had advised Japanese industry as it recovered after World War II. Among the key concepts learned by the Japanese and neglected for many years in the West were:

Deming’s teaching that we cannot inspect quality in a product but must build it into the manufacturing process.

Juran’s definition of the internal customer. If we each give service to our internal customer then we will ultimately take care of the end customer.

By applying these teachings and aggressively eliminating all sources of non-compliance the Japanese moved quality onto a completely different plane. Where the West continued to measure percentage defect rates our competitors were working in parts per million.

As well as addressing the manufacturing processes, we learned that the JIT approach considered other contributors to improved quality. Is the component designed in such a way as to make it easy to produce or can we simplify it and reduce the chances of a defect? We began to think of «design for manufacture» and combining the previously separate functions of design engineering and production engineering.

We heard about things called «quality circles» where people in different areas of the business came together to investigate problems and work as a team to solve them – rather than follow our own approach of each area attempting to blame another. Perhaps most disturbingly we heard that inspectors were a thing of the past. All had now been trained as quality engineers and were in fact working as process improvement specialists so that their old function was no longer required.

3. Supplier Partnerships

Perhaps the most challenging concept for many companies was that of working with suppliers as partners. Buyers who spent their lives playing one supplier off against others and switching from one to another to save pennies heard that their Japanese counterparts single-sourced in nearly all cases. What is more, large corporations such as Toyota sent out their own specialists in manufacturing improvement to help their suppliers. Where savings were identified then benefits would be shared amicably.

The most readily-visible consequence of this was better service from the company’s suppliers. If we were working together on agreed plans and the supplier could arrange activities based around a long-term relationships then we might avoid a major problem that plagued us in the West – that just as we played off suppliers against each other, they played off their customers. They never knew what demand they may get so they sought more orders than they could, in reality, fulfil. They then reacted to screams and shortages and tried not to fall out too often with each customer. All of this meant all customers holding safety stock to cope with the repeated failures.

Partnership approach brought other benefits – if we worked as true partners then we would not need to spend so much effort in continuously expediting. We could leave behind this ludicrous situation where we had to keep asking «is that order going to be on time?». We could also expect our suppliers to warn us of problems in advance. If their key piece of plant broke down and they told us now of the impact this might have in a week or two, then we could set our own plans to work around the problem.

4. The Elimination of Variety

Variety was recognised for its cost in that it complicated the manufacturing process. A sunroof on every Toyota Corolla was not only a marketing trick but a practical manufacturing improvement as having to make two different types of roof and two different types of headlining introduced potential problems.

5. Shortened Cycle Times

One point which we all understood was that our overall cycle times for our product dictated the level of work-in-progress (WIP). If we have an average lead time of four weeks for the components going through our welding department, then we will have an average WIP level of four weeks’ worth of production.

The Japanese had addressed this in a number of ways, primarily in a fundamental redesign of factory layout and process flow. We learned that rather than have one area of the plant for presses, another full of lathes, another drills, and so on, they had switched to «focussed factories» where each area of the plant made a particular type of component. The unit making drive shafts had saws, followed by milling, turning, drilling and so on. These focussed units then brought the opportunity for multi-skilling and teamwork which helped to provide for productivity improvements – as well as significantly reducing the movement of materials through the factory.

6. «Pull»

Essential Vocabulary

1. Material Requirements Planning – планирование потребности в материалах

2. Manufacturing Resource Planning – планирование производственных ресурсов

3. stock n – акция; товарные запасы

4. sophistication n – искушенность, изощренность, сложность

sophisticated a – искушенный, изощренный, сложный

5. lead time – время между размещением заказа и получением материалов от поставщика; время между началом производственного процесса и изготовлением первого изделия или всей партии

6. inventory n – запасы

7. just-in-time (JIT) – система «точно в срок»

8. breakthrough n – прорыв

9. highlight n – центр внимания, основной момент

highlight v – освещать, выдвигать на первый план

10. counterpart n – двойник, аналог, копия, дубликат; противная сторона

11. batch n – партия, группа

12. order n – приказ, распоряжение; заказ

order v – приказывать, распоряжаться; заказывать

13. set-up n – установка, наладка, система

set up v – устанавливать, налаживать

14. offset n – зачет, компенсация, возмещение

offset v – зачитывать, компенсировать, возмещать

15. workload n – рабочая нагрузка

16. Master Production Scheduling – главный план-график производства

17. accounting n – бухгалтерский учет

accounting a – бухгалтерский

18. accounting conventions – учетные правила

19. compliance n – согласие, соответствие правилам, соблюдение (законов, правил)

comply (with) v – соглашаться, соответствовать, соблюдать

20. quality circles – кружки качества

21. demand n – спрос, требование, потребность, нужда

demand v – требовать

demanding a – требовательный, сложный

22. failure n – неудача, провал, банкротство; отказ (в работе), повреждение, срыв, авария

fail v – потерпеть неудачу, провалиться, обанкротиться; отказать

23. expediting n – связь с поставщиками, время исполнения (время для розыска и выполнения потерянного или неправильно направленного заказа)

expeditor n – диспетчер, экспедитор

expedite v – ускорять

24. work-in-progress (WIP) – незавершенное производство, полуфабрикаты

25. cycle time – время рабочего цикла

26. layout n – схема расположения, компоновка, планировка, чертеж

lay out v – располагать, размещать; выделять средства

27. waste n – отходы, потери; расточительство, перерасход

waste v – терять, тратить попусту, расточать

28. dedication n – посвящение, преданность, приверженность

dedicate v – посвящать

dedicated a – посвященный, приверженный, преданный

29. lean manufacturing – рациональное производство

Exercise 1. Answer the following questions.

1. What were the news from Japan that amazed the US manufactureres and scholars around 1980? 2. What was the company that pioneered the development of the Japanese manufacturing principles? 3. Why did the US companies manufacture components and parts in large batches? 4. Why did the US companies hold safety stocks? 5. What were the ideas of the US quality gurus that the Japanese successfully applied? 6. What other contributors to improved quality did the JIT approach consider? 7. What was the underlying principle of the quality circles? 8. Why were partnership relations with suppliers so important? 9. Why does it make economic sense to eliminate variety? 10. How did the Japanese shorten cycle times? 11. What was the basic idea of kanban? 12. Why were the Japanese companies happy when they discovered some problem in a process? 13. What is the key premise of the Lean Manufacturing?

Exercise 2. An American car manufacturer hired a Japanese consultant to help enhance its competitiveness and cut costs. The advisor suggested applying some of the Japanese manufacturing principles. Invent a dialogue between the US vice-president for production and the foreign consultant. Use the following terms.

JIT

kanban

batch size

safety stocks

long-term partnership relations with suppliers

elimination of variety

shorter cycle-times

quality circles

elimination of waste

problem-solving

lean manufacturing

commitment to excellence

Exercise 3. Compare the American and Japanese management principles along the following lines.

Exercise 4*. Fill in the blanks using terms given below.

The Characteristics of the Japanese Approach to Business

The system of…….. in the large organizations is called Nenko Seido. This means:

– guaranteed employment until……… at 55;

– promotion and……….. by seniority;

– an internal labor market meaning………. from within the company;

– extensive…….. with an em on long-term behavior, attitudes and performance;

– extensive……… package, which is regarded as a right and incorporates the needs of the workers’ family;

– pay which starts off low, but rises dramatically with……….

Nenko workers in Japan are the privileged………. This system only applies to male……., and there are many smaller non– Nenko organizations, which service and supply their big brothers. The role of the non– Nenko organizations in the economy is to provide the……….. and lower………, achieved by lower wages, absence of job security, pensions, sick leaves, welfare benefits and bonuses.

The second distinctive characteristic of Japanese business is the fundamental importance of the group. Work is divided and allocated to groups, not individuals. The groups operate as specialists in dealing with………, but within the team the worker is regarded as a………… who will……… between jobs………. in company practices, rather than acquiring a specific technical skill.

The third feature, which is typical of Japanese corporation, is a very tight centralized control based on…………, which are linked to detailed planning. Also stringently controlled from the center is the……….. of trainee managers, who will ultimately be trusted to carry the company forward into the future.

Control is also indicative throughout the entire organization, particularly at an………… when applied to quality and technical……….. The concept of total quality management means a………. to a continuous improvement program and a strong…… on efficiency achieved by investment in the most modern plant and machinery available.

Managers adopt………. style of leadership and supervision. The manager will be the representative of the group as well as a technical…….. Despite the………. role that the individual plays to the group, consultation and consensus are seen as vital before decisions are made and action taken. There is much interaction and evolution in the……….. of new ideas and directions. Slow……… and tolerance of operating in ambiguous situations is normal. This is the direct opposite to what might be found in some western organizations where direct and decisive action taken by individual leaders operating without consultation and consensus is the norm.

The above characteristics can exist in the form they do because there is a strong corporate culture in every Japanese organization. This will be unique to the individual organization, but it is firmly………. in the culture and history of Japanese society as a whole. Key………. are obligation, duty, loyalty, cooperation and commitment to the company regarding it as the family to which the individual is bound.

Source: Corporate Strategy Study Guide, IFA Services Ltd., 2004.

Terms:

embedded, focus, recruitment, development, trouble shooter, subordiante, employment, operational level, rotate, remuneration, key performance indicators, promotions, decision making, efficiency, appraisal, generalist, welfare, seniority, minority, staff, flexibility, operating costs, tasks, training, commitment, hands-on, values, retirement

Exercise 5. Translate into English.

В поисках качества

В то время как американские менеджеры всегда говорили о том, что они «верят» в качество, что они «за» качество и всегда «боролись» за качество, большинство из них начинает понимать, что они ориентировались в основном на достижение некоего приемлемого уровня качества.

Несмотря на лозунги и призывы, качество пока еще не стало для американцев первоочередной задачей. Большинство руководителей компаний, управляющих, правительственных чиновников и экономических стратегов пока не думают о проблемах качества постоянно и ежедневно.

Главное в управлении качеством – не контроль, а бездефектная работа

Высокое качество обеспечивается главным образом путем налаживания бездефектного производства, а не через контроль уже готовой продукции. Основная идея такого подхода состоит в том, чтобы все усилия направить на ликвидацию самой возможности появления брака в процессе производства и сборки. В результате возможные дефекты устраняются еще на промежуточных этапах, а не в готовом изделии. В американских компаниях такой подход не получил пока массового распространения. Во многих случаях непроизводительная работа по проверке качества и устранению дефектов, выпуску новых деталей взамен бракованных отвлекает от 15 до 40% производственных мощностей предприятия. Причем затраты на эти работы составляют от 20 до 40% на каждый доллар продаж.

Одним из подходов, который дает возможность решить эти проблемы, является разработанная японцами система организации производства, получившая название «точно в срок».

Базовая идея этой системы весьма проста. Материалы и детали должны поступать на каждое рабочее место по соответствующим запросам точно в тот момент, когда в них возникает необходимость, а не храниться в больших количествах возле каждого рабочего места.

Главная цель такой системы состоит в постоянном совершенствовании процесса производства, ликвидации всех возможных потерь: времени, материалов и т. п.

В настоящее время сотни американских компаний с успехом применяют эту систему на практике – от «Кэмпбелл» и «Уорнер Ламберт» до «Моторолы» и «Интел». Например, применение этой системы в компании «Харлей энд Дэвидсон» позволило высвободить 22 млн долл., которые ранее были фиксированы в материальных запасах.

Использование такой системы позволяет также резко сократить расходы на аппарат управления, обнаруживать дефекты в ходе производства и устранять их сразу же на месте, обеспечить работу всех подразделений при минимальных затратах.

Конечно, внедрение такой системы требует четко отлаженного механизма и ответственности каждого работника на своем рабочем месте. Необходимо также преодолеть психологическое сопротивление менеджеров, которые не привыкли работать без страховых заделов и запасов.

Источник: выдержка из Грейсон Джексон К. младший, О’Делл Карла; «Американский менеджмент на пороге XXI века», http://ek.–lit.agava.ru

How Jack Welch Ran GE

If leadership is an art, then Welch has proved himself a master painter. Few have personified corporate leadership more dramatically. Fewer still have so consistently delivered on the results of that leadership. «The two greatest corporate leaders of the 20th century are Alfred Sloan of General Motors and Jack Welch of GE,» says Noel Tichy, a University of Michigan management professor. «And Welch would be the greater of the two because he set a new, contemporary paradigm for the corporation that is the model for the 21st century.»

It is a model that has delivered extraordinary growth, increasing the market value of GE from $12 billion in 1981 to about $280 billion in 2000. No one, not Microsoft’s William Gates, not Walt Disney’s Michael Eisner, not even the late Coca-Cola chieftain Roberto Goizueta, has created more shareholder value than Jack Welch.

Of course, GE’s success is hardly Welch’s alone. The company boasts what most headhunters believe to be the most talent-rich management in the world. Thus, Robert Wright has managed an astonishing turnaround at NBC, leading it to a fifth straight year of double-digit earnings gains in 1997 and a No.1 position in prime-time ratings. Nor did Welch’s magic work everywhere in GE. The huge appliance operation, for instance, saw operating earnings fall 39% in 1998, to $458 million.

Welch has transformed what was an old-line American industrial giant into a highly competitive global growth engine. Welch has reshaped the company through more than 600 acquisitions and a forceful push abroad into emerging markets. How did Welch, who sat atop a business empire with $304 billion in assets, $89.3 billion in sales, and 276,000 employees in more than 100 countries, did it?

He did it through sheer force of personality, coupled with an unbridled passion for winning the game of business and a keen attention to details many chieftains would simply overlook. He did it because he was a fierce believer in the power of his people.

Welch’s profound grasp on General Electric stemmed from knowing the company and those who work for it like no other. There were the thousands of «students» he has encountered in his classes at the Croton-on-Hudson campus. Then there was the way he spent his time: More than half was devoted to «people» issues. But most important, he has created something unique at a big company: informality.

Welch liked to call General Electric the «grocery store». «What’s important at the grocery store is just as important in engines or medical systems,» said Welch. «If the customer isn’t satisfied, if the stuff is getting stale, if the shelf isn’t right, it’s the same thing. You manage it like a small organization. You don’t get hung up on zeros.»

You don’t get hung up on formalities, either. If the hierarchy that Welch inherited, with its nine layers of management, hasn’t been completely undermined, it has been severely damaged. Everyone called him Jack. Everyone could expect to see him hurry down an aisle to pick through the merchandise on a bottom shelf or to surprise an employee with a bonus.

Making the company «informal» meant violating the chain of command, communicating across layers, paying people as if they worked not for a big company but for a demanding entrepreneur where nearly everyone knows the boss. It had as much to do with Welch’s charisma as it had to do with the less visible rhythms of the company – its meetings and review sessions – and how he used them to great advantage.

When Welch became CEO, he inherited a series of obligatory corporate events that he transformed into meaningful levers of leadership. These get-togethers allowed him to set and change the corporation’s agenda, to challenge the strategies and the people in each of GE’s dozen divisions, and to make his opinions known to all.

Welch believed that efficiencies in business were infinite because there were no bounds to human creativity. «The idea flow from the human spirit is absolutely unlimited,» Welch declared. «All you have to do is tap into that well. I don’t like to use the word efficiency. It’s creativity. It’s a belief that every person counts.»

Not surprisingly, Welch embraced the largest corporate quality initiative ever undertaken. For years, he had been skeptical of the quality programs that were the rage in the 1980s. He felt that they were too heavy on slogans and too light on results. That was before he heard Lawrence Bossidy telling about the benefits he was reaping from a quality initiative he had launched at AlliedSignal. Bossidy had borrowed the Six Sigma program from Motorola and reported that the company was lowering costs, increasing productivity, and generating more profit.

A Six Sigma quality level generates fewer than 3.4 defects per million operations in a manufacturing or service process. GE is running at a Sigma level of three to four. The gap between that and the Six Sigma level is costing the company between $8 billion and $12 billion a year in inefficiencies and lost productivity. To make the ideas take hold throughout GE required the training of so-called master black belts, black belts, and green belts. Welch launched the effort in late 1995 with 200 projects and intensive training programs, moved to 3,000 projects and more training in 1996, and implemented 6,000 projects and still more training in 1997. In 1998, Six Sigma delivered $320 million in productivity gains and profits, more than double Welch’s original goal of $150 million. «Six Sigma has spread like wildfire across the company, and it is transforming everything we do,» boasted Welch.

Show and Tell

The success of the program was evident in 1998 at Boca Raton, where Welch kicked off each year with a meeting for the top 500 executives. That year, 29 managers spoke about their Six Sigma projects describing how they used new ideas to squeeze still more profit out of the lean machine that is GE. One after another explained how quality efforts cut costs and mistakes, enhanced productivity, and eliminated the need for investment in new plant and equipment.

William Woodburn, who headed GE’s industrial diamonds business, was one of the 1998 heroes at Boca. In just 4 years, Woodburn had increased the operation’s return on investment fourfold and halved the cost structure.

Employing Six Sigma ideas, he and his team have squeezed so much efficiency out of their existing facilities that they believed they have eliminated the need for all investment in plant and equipment for a decade. Some 300 other managers from GE have visited the plant to learn directly how Woodburn has done it.

But the main event was Welch’s wrap-up comments. Even though GE had just ended a record year, with earnings up 13%, Welch wanted more. Most CEOs would give a feel-good, congratulatory chat. But Welch warned the group that it would face one of the toughest years in a decade. It’s no time to be complacent, he said, not with the Asian economic crisis, not with deflation in the air.

Then, the ideas tumbled out of him for how they can combat deflation. «Don’t add costs,» he advised. «Increase inventory turns. Use intellectual capital to replace plant and equipment investment. Raise approvals for price decisions.»

Roses and Champagne

Welch was uncommonly conscious of the signals and symbolism of leadership. His handwritten notes sent to everyone from direct reports to hourly workers possessed enormous impact, too. Moments after Welch lifted his black felt-tip pen, they were sent via fax direct to the employee. Two days later, the original arrived in the mail.

They were written to inspire and motivate as often as to stir and demand action. In 1996, for example, Woodburn turned down a promotion from Welch that would have required a transfer because he didn’t want to move his teenage daughter out of school. Welch spoke to Woodburn on the phone and within a day sent a personal note to him.

«Bill,» wrote Welch, «we like you for a lot of reasons – one of them is that you are a very special person. You proved it again this morning. Good for you and your lucky family. Make Diamonds a great business and keep your priorities straight.» To Woodburn, the note was an important gesture. «It showed me he cared about me not as a manager but as a person. It means a lot.»

Or consider how Welch became involved in the excruciating details of the tubes that go into GE’s X-ray and CAT-scan machines. In the mid-1990s, Welch, who spent 15% to 20% of his time interacting with customers, heard some complaints about the poor quality of the tubes. The product was averaging little more than 25,000 scans, less than half what competing tubes were getting.

To fix the problem, Welch reached two levels down into the organization and summoned to corporate headquarters Marc Onetto who had been general manager for service and maintenance in Europe. His orders were simple and direct: «Fix it,» Welch demanded. «I want 100,000 scans out of my tubes!»

For the next four years, Onetto faxed weekly reports direct to Welch, detailing his progress. Back would come notes from Welch every three to four weeks. Some would nearly growl for greater progress; others would flatter and cajole. The experience astonished Onetto. «I was just running a little business here, about $450 million in revenues, and I was so amazed that he could find the time to read my reports and then even send me back notes,» he said. Since then, Onetto’s team has created versions of the tubes that average between 150,000 and 200,000 scans. The improvements added about $14 million in productivity benefits to the division last year.

Not everyone saw that side of Welch. Some rank-and-file employees, for example, grumbled about the unrelenting pressure on them to perform. «No matter how many records are broken in productivity or profits, it’s always ‘What have you done for me lately?» ’ said Stephen Tormey, who negotiated the United Electrical Workers contract. «The workers are considered lemons, and they are squeezed really dry.»

Other critics have questioned whether the pressure Welch imposed led some employees to cut corners, possibly contributing to the defense-contracting scandals that have plagued GE or the humiliating Kidder, Peabody bond-trading scheme of the early 1990s that generated bogus profits.

Stick and Carrot

Few would dispute that Welch was seen as a demanding executive who aroused a mixture of awe and fear. Aware of the daunting effect he can have on people, Welch worked hard to counter that i. Not long ago, recalled human relations chief William J. Conaty, one manager who had to make a presentation before Welch was so apprehensive he was shaking. It was the first time he had met Welch, who was passing through St. Louis. «I’m so nervous,» the manager confessed to Welch. «And my wife has told me she’ll throw me out of the house if I can’t get through this presentation.»

At day’s end, when Welch was back on the corporate plane, he immediately arranged for a dozen roses and a bottle of Dom Perignon to be delivered to the man’s home. He then wrote a note to the wife: «Your husband did a fantastic job today. We’re sorry we put him and you through this for a couple of weeks.»

Welch set precise performance targets and monitored them throughout the year. And each of Welch’s direct reports received from Welch handwritten, two-page job evaluation at the end of every year. Attached to the detailed notes were his jottings from a year earlier, with new comments written in red pencil: «Nice job.» «Still needs work.»

Every bonus, and every stock-option grant to Welch’s 20 or so direct reports came with a candid talk about performance. «There are carrots and sticks here, and he is extraordinarily good at applying both,» said a senior VP. «When he hands you a bonus or a stock option, he lets you know exactly what he wants in the coming year.»

Welch skillfully used rewards to drive behavior. Welch demanded that the rewards a leader disbursed to people be highly differentiated. Although GE set an overall 4% salary increase as a target in 1998, base salaries could rise by as much as 25% in a year without a promotion. Cash bonuses could increase as much as 150% in a year. Stock options, once reserved for the most senior officers at GE, have been broadly expanded under Welch. Now, some 27,000 employees get them, nearly a third of GE’s professional employees. Unlike many companies that hand out options as automatic annual grants, Welch did not want GE’s program to be perceived as a «dental plan.» So everyone who received options didn’t get them every year.

Welch has been a major beneficiary of stock options. Yet few things energized Welch as much as reviewing a list of GE employees who cash in their rewards. Combing through the names, Welch could hardly contain his enthusiasm – for the wealth he has put into the hands of people whose names were unfamiliar to him. In the first quarter of 1998 alone, some 3,900 employees exercised 8.7 million options with a net value of $520 million. «It means that everyone is getting the rewards, not just a few of us,» he said. «That’s a big deal. We’re changing their game and their lives».

While analysts on Wall Street or GE’s own investors viewed Welch’s likely legacy as creating the world’s most valuable company in stock market terms, Welch himself saw things quite differently. The man who spent more than 50% of his time on people issues considered his greatest achievement the care and feeding of talent. «This place runs by its great people,» said Welch. «The biggest accomplishment I’ve had is to find great people. An army of them. They are all better than most CEOs.»

While many companies profess to run as meritocracies, in reality, they are often conscious of class. At GE many of the company’s most successful executives were, like Welch, the first in their families to earn college degrees. When it came time to pick a new CFO, for instance, Welch passed over several candidates in line for the job in favor of then 38-year-old Dennis Dammerman two layers down in the ranks because he was impressed with how he had handled other tough assignments.

In every potential leader, Welch was looking for what he called «E to the fourth power.» That was his term for people who have enormous personal energy, the ability to motivate and energize others, «edge» – the GE code word for being instinctively competitive – and the skill to execute on those attributes.

On September 7, 2001, Jack Welch said goodbye to GE, and its people. He appointed Jeff Immelt to succeed him and set in place a staff that he believes will support his successor. The next chapter in GE’s history began.

Source: Business Week (online), June 8, 1998, abridged

Essential Vocabulary

1. market value – рыночная ценность

2. shareholder value – ценность для акционеров

3. headhunter n – специалист по подбору кадров

4. turnaround n – благоприятный поворот (конъюнктуры, дел компании); вывод компании из кризиса

turn around v – выводить (компанию) из кризиса