Как гибнут великие и почему некоторые компании никогда не сдаются Коллинз Джим
Краткий обзор. Известная своим исключительным качеством обслуживания клиентов, Nordstrom заработала репутацию одной из величайших розничных сетей двадцатого века. В 1990-е годы у компании начался затяжной спад, перешедший в резкое падение в 2000 году, когда существенно снизилась выручка магазинов. В 2000—2006 годы компанией руководил представитель четвертого поколения семьи Блейк Нордстром и компании удалось быстро восстановить утраченные позиции. Нордстром сфокусировался на маховике основного бизнеса, который когда-то и сделал компанию великой, — на обслуживании клиентов и профессиональной организации продаж, — при этом заметно усовершенствовав вспомогательные системы, например контроль за запасами275.
Ниже я описал восстановление Nordstrom в рамках концепции «от хорошего к великому» (объяснение этой концепции дано в приложении 7).
Лидерство 5-го уровня. Блейк Нордстром сам отвечал на телефонные звонки — так было принято в их семье. Он восстановил структуру в виде перевернутой пирамиды, где руководители были внизу, а потребители и работающие непосредственно с ними продавцы располагались наверху. И принял на себя ответственность за проблемы компании:
" Для меня и моих братьев очевидно, что /в упадке] виноваты мы — не культура, а мы персонально276.
Сначала «кто» затем «что» Перестройка в Nordstrom началась с серьезных изменений в команде руководителей — включая CEO, исполнительного, финансового директора и президента розничной сети. Команда Нордстрома вернулась к идее принимать сотрудников на работу, основываясь на их ценностях и характере, а не навыках — «мы можем нанять хороших людей и научить их продавать, но не можем нанять продавцов и научить их быть хорошими людьми». Они вернулись к строгому правилу «правильные сотрудники на ключевых позициях». Как сказал об этом один из руководителей компании:
" По мне так лучше мы время от времени будем проигрывать в судах, чем держать работников, которые не соответствуют нашим стандартам. Потому что слабый работник ослабляет тех, кто рядом с ним, и тянет их вниз277.
Не отрицать неприятные факты. Блейк Нордстром не отрицал тот факт, что Nordstrom начала забывать свою одержимость обслуживанием клиентов и отчаянно нуждается в обновлении базовых блоков, в частности, за счет привязки системы управления запасами к системе, объединяющей кассовые терминалы. Он вложил $200 млн в новую систему постоянного учета запасов, чтобы Nordstrom могла одновременно сократить складские издержки и увеличить вероятность того, что продавец легко отыщет именно тот товар, который нужен покупателю278.
«Стратегия ежа». Команда Нордстрома вдохнула новую жизнь в ключевую концепцию компании, которая, возможно, была лучшей розничной сетью в мире с точки зрения отношений между продавцом и покупателем. И ее восстановление базировалось на простой, элегантной идее: нужно вернуться к построению долгосрочных связей с покупателями за счет поддержки специалистов-продавцов вспомогательными системами (особенно системой управления запасами), которые подверглись значительному усовершенствованию, и тем самым улучшить экономику бизнеса, основным показателем которой является рентабельность инвестированного капитала. Они глубоко осознали то, что экономическая прибыль определяется отношением маржи в денежном выражении к средней стоимости запасов279.
Культура ответственности. Нордстром и его соратники восстановили изначальный подход, который когда-то сделал Nordstrom великой компанией. Он состоял из следующих шагов: сформировать увлеченную команду специалистов по продажам, установить очень высокие ожидания по результативности и качеству обслуживания клиентов и дать людям свободу принимать те решения, которые позволят обслужить покупателя наилучшим образом. Они создали свод правил Nordstrom, который, собственно, содержал всего лишь одно правило: во всех ситуациях использовать здравый смысл. «Возможно, главное наше достижение, — писал Блейк Нордстром в годовом отчете 2003 года, — это то, что мы становимся более ответственной компанией»280.
Маховик, а не порочный круг. Блейк Нордстром фокусировался на «небольших, но важных шагах», а не крупных кардинальных изменениях. Он не стал отрицать неудачу кампании «Открой себя заново», обошедшейся ему в $40 млн: «[Это] была попытка сделать что-то необычное, и мы перестали осознавать, кто мы есть. Потребители явно не желали открывать себя заново и не хотели, чтобы компания занималась “самооткрытием”». В 2004 году Блейк Нордстром заметил:
" Для нашей компании успех означает не принятие новой стратегии или переход к совершенно иной бизнес-модели. Успех для нас — это продолжать делать то, что мы уже делаем хорошо, и пользоваться своими преимуществами281.
Лучше приобрести часы, чем постоянно спрашивать, который час. Блейк Нордстром сосредоточился на создании культуры и вспомогательных систем поддержки, чтобы возрождение Nordstrom не было связано с деятельностью того или иного лидера. Он перестроил команду управленцев так, чтобы руководство компанией не зависело исключительно от него — если бы он подал в отставку, успешный разворот, скорее всего, продолжился бы. Когда я писал эту книгу, Блейк Нордстром оставался президентом282.
Сохраняя ядро компании, стимулировать прогресс. Блейк Нордстром подчеркивал вдохновляющие и проверенные временем ключевые ценности Nordstrom (обслуживание покупателей превыше всего, страсть к совершенствованию, предпринимательская этика, отличная репутация), хотя произвел серьезные изменения в системах и методах, необходимых для воплощения этих ценностей в жизнь. — новые системы, повсеместное применение передовых подходов, более рациональная тактика закупок253.
Приложение 7: схема «От хорошего к великому» — краткий обзор концепции"
Примечание: на сайте www.jimcollins.com мы разместили некоторые инструменты, которые позволяют диагностировать и оценивать компании сквозь призму данной концепции. Их можно использовать бесплатно.
Лидерство 5-гоуровня. Лидеры 5-го уровня думают в первую очередь о деле, о компании, о работе — а не о себе — и решительно намерены во что бы то ни стало добиться успеха. Лидеры 5-го уровня демонстрируют парадоксальную смесь личной скромности и профессиональной воли.
Сначала «кто», затем «что». Те, кто строит великие компании, вначале стараются убедиться, что «на борту» находятся лишь правильные сотрудники, а все неправильные остались «на берегу» и что первые займут все ключевые места раньше, чем будет принято решение, куда «плыть». Они всегда вначале думают «кто?» и только потом — «что?».
Не отрицать неприятные факты — парадокс Сток-дэйла. Сохраняйте непоколебимую веру в то, что в итоге вы победите, как бы трудно ни было, и в то же время обладайте достаточной ответственностью для того, чтобы не отрицать даже самые неприятные факты вашей нынешней реальности, какими бы они ни были.
«Стратегия ежа». Величие достигается благодаря серии удачных решений, согласующихся с простой согласованной концепцией — «стратегией ежа». Это операционная модель, которая отражает понимание трех пересекающихся кругов: что вы можете стать лучшими в мире в области, которой страстно увлечены и которая наилучшим образом питает ваш экономический или ресурсный двигатель.
Культура ответственности. Рациональные люди, использующие рациональное мышление и предпринимающие рациональные действия — свободно, но в границах ответственности, — вот краеугольный камень культуры, которая создает величие. Люди не «имеют работу» — они принимают ответственность.
Маховик. Нет какого-то одного все определяющего действия, одной великой программы, убийственной инновации, исключительного удачного прорыва, таинственного момента. Скорее, процесс напоминает бесконечное раскручивание огромного тяжелого маховика, поворот за поворотом, создавая инерцию для прорыва и дальнейшего движения.
Лучше приобрести часы, чем постоянно спрашивать, который час. Воистину великие компании процветают при многих поколениях лидеров, что прямо противоположно построению вокруг одного-единственного великого лидера, великой идеи или конкретной программы. Лидеры в великих компаниях создают каталитические механизмы для стимулирования прогресса и не очень стараются завоевать репутацию харизматических личностей для того, чтобы делать дело; в действительности многие умеют обходиться без харизмы.
Сохраняя ядро компании, стимулировать прогресс. Устойчиво великие компании характеризуются фундаментальным качеством. С одной стороны, у них есть набор вневременных ключевых ценностей и основная причина существования, которые остаются неизменными в течение длительных периодов. С другой стороны, им присуще неустанное стремление к изменениям и прогрессу — непреодолимый творческий зуд, который часто проявляется в выборе «БИХАГов» (Big Hairy Audacious Goals — «больших наглых волосатых целей»). Великие компании проводят четкие различия между своими ключевыми ценностями (которые никогда не меняются) и операционными стратегией и тактикой (которые непрерывно адаптируются под меняющийся мир).
Примечания
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38. Источник: ©2006 CRSP Центр изучения котировок ценных бумаг Высшей школы бизнеса Чикагского университета. Авторские права защищены, www.crsp.chicagobooth.edu.
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40. Источник: ©2006 CRSP Центр изучения котировок ценных бумаг Высшей школы бизнеса Чикагского университета. Авторские права защищены, www.crsp.chicagobooth.edu.
41. Из личных бесед с автором.
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